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ABSTRACT: This article encourages operational thinkers to apply
the philosophies of Carl von Clausewitz, Thucydides, and Mao
Zedong when integrating technology into future war strategy to
remember that humans not only begin wars but also end them.

T

he contemporary literature on future war remains too focused
on the tactical level. General John R. Allen and Amir Husain’s
recent article in Proceedings entitled “On Hyperwar” illustrates
this fixation. Similar to other writings, Allen and Hussain argue victory, in
future war, will be predicated upon integrating increasing levels of artificial
intelligence and bypassing human decision-makers.1 Such an operational
concept claims wars will become more efficient, synchronized, and quick
to solve the limitations of human endurance and the natural propensity
for indecision in the face of uncertainty.
Seeking game-changing capabilities to neutralize potential US
adversaries is clearly important; however, writers of this literature often
overlook operational applications of future capabilities. Thus, impacts are
viewed in isolation.2 Undeniably, senior leaders have a practical grasp of
the nature of war due to the breadth and depth of their experience.
Military and civilian leaders can, however, interpret tech-centric
solutions as indications that overcoming near-peer adversaries simply
requires technological superiority. Consequently, we run the risk of
embracing hardware that conflicts with the nature of war, and we avoid
a serious discussion of how a thinking enemy may respond and adjust.
The key failure of most discussions on future systems stems from
the claim that these capabilities can somehow override the factors of fog,
friction, and uncertainty—or even change human nature. Ultimately, this
assumption obscures the fact that war is the use of violence to impose
one’s will on the enemy. This article argues that separating the nature of
war from the character of warfare makes understanding the integration
of innovative technologies and their roles in future wars easier.

1      John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” Proceedings 143, no. 7 (July 2017): 30–37;
and B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2017).
2   For more on the 4+1 framework, which includes Russia, China, North Korea, Iran
and transnational violent extremism, see Fred Dews, “Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on
the “4+1 Framework and Meeting Transnational Threats,” Brookings Now (blog), Brookings,
February 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs
-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/.
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Nature of War versus Character of Warfare

Does distinguishing between the nature of war and character
of warfare matter? Yes, and the difference is more than nuance and
actually determines how we think about war. Antulio J. Echevarria
II argues “our understanding of war’s nature, or whether we believe
it has one, influences how we approach the conduct of war—how we
develop military strategy, doctrine and concepts, and train and equip
combat forces.” 3 An understanding of the nature of war establishes the
intellectual foundation upon which the character of warfare develops.
In other words, a flawed foundation compromises the entire structure.
Therefore, a common understanding of the nature of war should
be achieved before discussing types of warfare like drone, artificial
intelligence (AI), and cyber. Echevarria warns “many discussions of the
nature of war, however, fail to distinguish between war, as an act of
violence, and warfare, as the technique of applying that violence.” 4 This
oversight results in conflating the two terms. Just as a sailboat tossed
by the wind and the sea risks landing on rocks when the captain lacks
situational awareness, a discussion of future capabilities will result in
operational failure if strategists do not maintain a clear eye on the
nature of war.
Carl von Clausewitz compared warfare in each age to a chameleon
in the sense that societal values influence the character of warfare.
Moreover, Clausewitz reminds us “war is more than a true chameleon
that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” 5 For Clausewitz,
war is a phenomenon dominated by three interrelated tendencies
generally translated as enmity, reason, and chance and probability.6 Each
tendency is associated with a particular entity, specifically the civilian
population (enmity), the government (reason), and the military (chance
and probability). Aspects of each tendency exist within each category—
for example, the military realm, characterized by chance and probability,
also contains elements of enmity and reason. The distinction highlights
the inherent interdependent interactions among the tendencies and
defies reductionist attempts to treat the tendencies as variables within
an algebraic equation.

What is War?

War constitutes an extreme contest among conscious beings. The
clash of wills relates to the three tendencies, especially enmity, informing
the means selected (violence) to fulfill the aim (disarmament) and to
achieve the purpose (impose will). In this way, the level of enmity—or
hostility—acts as a wellspring supporting the will. Likewise, enmity
applies equally to supranational organizations and the individuals
3      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 58.
4      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 57.
5      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.
6      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
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occupying the battlefield. “Peace may be the ultimate object of war,”
as Clausewitz acknowledged, “but war . . . occurs whenever one party
resists the violent actions of another.” 7 In other words, war only occurs
when a defender opposes the attacker.
The nature of war also remains oriented on destroying the enemy’s
forces and seizing terrain, an interaction often overlooked in the current
preoccupation with drones and artificial intelligence technology. In order
to achieve war’s purpose, it is necessary to wage violence and render an
enemy powerless. Discussions of technological developments related to
drone, swarm, and cyber warfare obscure this reality—or at a minimum,
undersell how difficult it is to impose one’s will on the enemy—in favor
of focusing on supporting friendly force efforts to reduce fog and
friction and devising ways to keep humans off the battlefield.
Although empty battlefields have been a trend since at least the
mid-nineteenth century, battles and decisive engagements occur
among humans. This sentiment is not merely romantic but relates to
an appreciation of war as an extreme contest of wills among conscious
beings, which requires a series of purposeful engagements oriented
toward disarming the enemy and imposing one’s will.
The following section offers historical examples that illustrate
how concepts drive doctrine, and it explains the consequences when
either fails to embed the character of warfare within the nature of
war. Concepts drive doctrine by anticipating future requirements and
framing the discussion; however, the real work of converting concepts
into doctrine involves the painstaking task of socializing concepts. The
DOTmLPF-P analysis process, which examines doctrine, organization,
training, matériel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
policy, exemplifies this complexity.8 In the United States, this effort
requires appealing to Congress for funding and gaining the active
support of the affected military services. Frequently, such concepts are
organized around some kind of technological innovation.
Likewise, advancements in technology are not sole factors that
enable military revolution. Future war discussions often base conclusions
on a capability’s game changing—and theoretical—contributions
at the tactical level. This posture limits the accuracy of efforts to
capture efficacy at the operational level. Historian Clifford J. Rogers
argued technological change accounts for only one of four essential
ingredients needed to generate a revolution in military affairs.9
Others noted, “Military revolutions recast society and the state as well
military organizations” whereas revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)
7      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 143.
8      “DOTmLPF-P Analysis,” Defense Acquisition University, June 16, 2017, https://www.dau
.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=d11b6afa-a16e-43cc-b3bb-ff8c9eb3e6f2.
9      Clifford J. Rogers, “As if a New Sun Had Arisen: England’s Fourteenth-Century RMA,” in The
Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300–2050, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18. Historian John T. Kuehn explained there is a “discriminator
of control” where “RMAs have a level of human control that military-social revolutions do not”
(message to author, July 19, 2017).
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take advantage of the transformative nature of military revolutions to
innovate a “new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized subbranch of warfare” since “the most effective mix is rarely apparent in
advance.” 10 Other components include systems development, operational
innovation, and organizational adaptation.11

Evolution of Warfare

In other words, technology alone is no more likely to result in a
military revolution than buying grapes allows you to make great wine.
Nonetheless, technological advancements are often touted as reducing
fog and friction, or at least making wars quicker and less violent. This
perspective, probably a hangover of the European Enlightenment,
received broad support even into the twentieth century.12 But Clausewitz
noted, “The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement
of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of
civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to
destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.” 13 This fact
remains true.

Industrial Weaponry
In the years leading up to World War I, European leaders, especially
in Germany, appreciated the lethality of modern weapons and expanded
rail lines to enable mobilization and concentration on a massive scale.
The ability to concentrate force, combined with increased lethality, was
argued to ensure wars would be short precisely because they would be
so violent. Strangely, armies, supported by inexhaustible moral fortitude,
were assumed to retain their ability to mount spirited offensives into
prepared defenses and withering machinegun fire; however, not all were
convinced.14 In 1899, a Polish banker named Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch
published a startlingly accurate, largely ignored, treatise that disagreed
with the popular opinion and sought to convince political leaders that
wars of entrenchment would dominate the immediate future.15 The
war’s opening moves offered a lethal laboratory for the ongoing debate
regarding the changing character of warfare.
The French army’s actions to prevent the Germans from reaching
the sea led to the so-called miracle of the Marne. Commanders on both
sides began to realize that instead of achieving martial glory through
bold offensives and skilled flanking maneuvers, men would remain
in destitute trenches stretching for hundreds of miles. Swift, violent
10     Knox and Williamson, Dynamics of Military Revolution, 12.
11    Rogers, “New Sun,” 18.
12    Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light: Plato versus Aristotle, and the Struggle for the Soul of Western
Civilization (New York: Random House, 2013), 366–67.
13    Clausewitz, On War, 76.
14    Michael Howard, “Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” in Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 518–19.
15    Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations: Is
War Now Impossible? (Toronto: William Briggs, 1900).
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actions were replaced with a methodical battle based on the artillery’s
significant firepower. This reality necessitated expending millions of
rounds in preparation for costly assaults, which even in the best cases
only facilitated small, disconnected penetrations.16
Concepts and doctrine preceding World War I appreciated the
devastating power of modern weapons; however, they failed to grasp
changes in the character of warfare, specifically the strength of the
defense. Additionally, armies on all sides discounted the effects of fog,
friction, and uncertainty as well as the depth of enmity animating the
will. In other words, they failed to take into account how the enemy
would respond and adapt. The nature of war did not change; however,
misreading the character of warfare obscured realities.

Tactical Foundations
The famed, and much studied, German blitzkrieg against France
in World War II succeeded primarily because French doctrine was
flawed. German tactical innovations during the interwar period solved
the problems of static defenses that characterized the Great War. The
majority of these innovations focused on calibrating a quantitative
balance among armored, mechanized, and infantry to penetrate
and exploit enemy defenses. The Wehrmacht’s penchant for tactical
actions, however, came at the cost of strengthening their intelligence
and sustainment capabilities. Arguably, this distaste for supporting
functions meant tactical innovations, over the long term, would miss
opportunities to link engagements in a meaningful way. Additionally,
whether due to cultural, geopolitical, or ideological reasons, German
war planners included too many invalid assumptions to support a
normative perspective.
In the end, Germany ultimately suffered a decisive defeat. As
historians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett wrote, “No amount
of operational virtuosity . . . redeemed fundamental flaws in political
judgment. . . . Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever.” 17 The examples provided
by World War II provide a myriad of lessons learned, not least of which
includes ensuring war plans reflect geostrategic realities. Germany’s
swift defeat of the French army indicated a greater appreciation for
the changing character of warfare; however, the Allied response
demonstrated the level of will achievable when the wellspring of enmity
runs deep.

Pentomic Concept
In the Cold War’s early years, the US Army, under the leadership
of General Maxwell D. Taylor, reorganized infantry and airborne
16      Robert A. Doughty, “French Operational Art 1888–1940,” in Historical Perspectives of the
Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 2005), 82.
17    Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “Lessons of War,” National Interest 14 (Winter
1988/9): 85.
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formations into pentomic divisions. Without doubt this period was
transformative for the US military and came on the heels of the Korean
War and the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. A strange
confluence of high-tech weapons and a resurgence of revolutionary
warfare spread across Eastern Europe and Asia. Americans felt a nuclear
war with the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility. Civilian and military
decision-makers faced a complex set of security challenges and often
disagreed on how to solve them.
For the Army, the pentomic design was “adopted as an interim
measure for the Cold War” and incorporated tactical nuclear weapons
to defeat Soviet invaders in large-scale battles occurring in denselypopulated European cities.18 The guiding doctrine emphasized the
concepts of dispersion, mobility, and flexibility.19 The intent was for
infantry formations on the battlefield to avoid the enemy’s nuclear
strikes by remaining dispersed, yet retain enough mobility to enable
concentration when ordered. The development of the Pentomic Division
sought to renew the Army’s relevance as a land force in a postnuclear
international system and required competing with the Air Force and
Navy for resources.
The Army instituted changes across the DOTmLPF-P continuum
and invested in advanced weapon systems including air defense, missiles,
space exploration, and a portfolio of tactical nuclear weapons with
innocuous names like Little John, Honest John, and Davy Crockett. “Yet
having acquired its missiles and nuclear weapons, and having adopted its
pentomic structure,” A. J. Bacevich reflects, “the Army found itself by
the end of the 1950s organized not to fight but almost solely to deter.” 20
The Army attempted to match its organization for “rapid technological
advance.” 21 And in doing so, “the Army dangerously lost its focus,
leading to rushed force designs and incomplete testing and wargaming
throughout the Pentomic division’s development.” 22
The military leaders responsible for leading the pentomic era were
the heroes of World War II and the Korean War. But, the noise
that promoted the changing character of warfare encouraged deviations
in force structures and weapon procurement. Ironically, these reductions
resulted in an Army that inadvertently violated its own ideal of flexibility
and promoted doctrine that lacked realistic application at the operational
level. Likewise, “severe equipment and technical shortcomings also
ensured that the Pentomic division was simply not prepared to succeed
in conventional warfare.” 23 In short, the Army was unprepared to fight
an atomic or a conventional war.
18      Virgil Ney, Evolution of the U.S. Army Division 1939–1968 (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for
Federal Scientific & Technical Information, 1969), 74.
19     Richard W. Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance: The U.S. Army Division in the Twentieth Century
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 25.
20      A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1986), 141.
21      Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 4.
22      Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 27.
23      Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 27.
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Bacevich adds to Arthur S. Collins’s observation that “ ‘our American
enthusiasm for more gadgets and fewer men has carried us away’ with
results that were wrongheaded and even dangerous.” 24 Ultimately, the
realities of this unworkable design gave way to a more realistic, although
equally tenuous, doctrine of active defense. Army leaders justified the
pentomic design to the public by heedlessly leaping between tactics and
strategy while ignoring the elements of fog, friction, and chance. The
key takeaway from this period is to recognize the danger of restructuring
organizations and doctrine to fit an invalid character of warfare,
especially when it precludes purposeful analysis and honest wargaming
at the operational level.

Operational Tactics
In the case of Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
sought to match a vigorous bombing campaign with diplomatic overtures
in an attempt to demonstrate American power and compel Hanoi
to negotiate. The approach failed because it was premised on flawed
assumptions and did not account for the extreme measures the North
Vietnamese were willing to take to continue fighting.25 This scenario is
an example of the complexity created by the interdependent relationship
of the three tendencies (enmity, reason, and chance) and increased by the
factors of fog, friction, and uncertainty.
Likewise, failing to anticipate an enemy’s response is characteristic
of flashy technological pitches claiming “shock and awe” will drain
the enemy’s will and paralyze its decision-making. This outcome rarely
happens, and it certainly does not last long enough to exploit the
advantage and achieve decisive victory. Domino warfare, for example,
and its related subcategories of effects-based operations, network-centric
warfare, and systemic operational design are entrancing as characters of
warfare but fail when they are nested within the nature of war.26 Each
one overlooks war as an extreme contest among conscious beings.
Effects-based operations and similar constructs fail because they
misjudge the relationship between combatants. When employed in
situations where actors are willing to modify their behavior to preserve
the system’s structure, effects-based operations work. In hierarchical
organizations with an observable power differential, such as those that
exist between a boss and employee or a parent and child, the construct
will be successful because one entity is willing to be subordinate to the
other. Therefore, one can impose his will without using physical violence
to disarm the opponent: there is no defense and thus no war.
This principle suggests that accounting for the enemy’s response
requires the ability to explain how tactical engagements are likely to
unfold and to set the conditions for subsequent actions. This capability
24      Arthur S. Collins Jr., “The Other Side of the Atom,” Army 10 (November 1959): 18–19,
quoted in Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 138.
25      Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 271.
26      John T. Kuehn, letter to the editor, Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4th Quarter 2009): 7.
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requires developing both friendly and enemy operational approaches to
envision how an enemy may adapt to new technologies. As such, the
development of an enemy’s possible operational approach is iterative and
it must be refined as enemy actions either confirm or deviate from the
strategist’s assumptions.
The character of warfare calibrates the means necessary to achieve
the aim and fulfill the purpose; however, it must act according to the
nature of war and not seek to make war something foreign to itself.27
Clausewitz wrote, “Strategy is the use of the engagement for the
purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim
for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance
with its purpose.” 28 This concept underscores the necessity of thinking
at the operational level and not relying on sleight of hand or a deus ex
machina to shift between tactics and strategy.

Digital Battlefields
The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that the integration of
digitization and precision-guided munitions could accelerate decisionmaking and shorten the kill chain against a large, and presumably
modern, military.29 Coalition actions during the conflict expertly
calibrated efforts across war’s means, aim, and purpose. America’s
unanswered technological overmatch sought to replace fog, friction,
and uncertainty with high degrees of efficiency, lethality, and
synchronization. But, the total dominance exhibited by coalition forces
prompted several adversarial nations, including Russia and China, to
commission studies analyzing ways to overcome the emergent character
of warfare, which resulted in publications such as Unrestricted Warfare.30
Over time, America’s adversaries developed ways to mitigate and
to overcome the US military’s conventional superiority by calculating
our threshold for the employment of war’s means. Their goal is to
shift the character of warfare from digitization and precision-guided
munitions toward gray-zone activities while simultaneously preparing
for conventional war. Conversely, the intoxicating effects of the Persian
Gulf War revalidated the US obsession with high-tech systems and the
importance of maintaining that character of warfare.
America’s pursuit of new offsets seeks to minimize further, if not
eliminate, the factors of fog, friction, and uncertainty. Arguably, the
original intent behind the development of digitization and precision
munitions was to make war’s means more lethal and effective; however,
precision munitions can lull decision-makers into a false sense of
superiority while increasing sensitivity to perceptions of collateral
damage. Ultimately, the inability to discern between the nature of war
27      “Pity the theory that conflicts with reason!” Clausewitz, On War, 136.
28      Clausewitz, On War, 177.
29      Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 9.
30      Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America
(Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
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and the character of warfare constrains military actions and often results
in protracted limited wars for limited aims.

Advancing Technology
Osama bin Laden’s terror attacks on September 11, 2001, sought
to inflict maximum violence against American citizens on American
soil. His purpose was to bring the United States to its knees and force
an immediate withdrawal from the Middle East. Obviously, the attacks
had the opposite effect and he was killed. Despite Saddam Hussein’s
execution for crimes against humanity, bin Laden’s death during
a US raid of his compound, and the rapid overthrow of the Taliban
in Afghanistan, America remains embroiled in a long-term struggle
against fundamentalism.
The conflict continues to transform and spread to new geographic
locales. The fight is waged against an enemy that lacks—and exploits—
America’s technological dominance. Nonstate actors, who lack high-tech
capacities and cannot prevent friendly access to the sophisticated
architecture undergirding command and control, movement and
maneuver, and munitions guidance, provide nations, like the United
States, with opportunities to test new capabilities.
This superiority can lead to a reliance on systems that makes the
means of war easier to employ against terrorists, but the practice may
codify a character of warfare unsuitable against a near-peer threat.
Historian John A. Lynn noted, “The culture of technological gullibility
invites defeat by ignoring the unchanging reality of war as the domain
of chance, violence, and politics.” 31 This technological gullibility can be
overcome by paying increased attention to the operational level of war
and by envisioning how a thinking enemy, possessing a will buoyed by
enmity, may react to and resist war’s aim and purpose.
Likewise, when faced with a near-peer enemy, technological
advancements aimed at increasing information flow may result in the
opposite effect. Arguably, after a certain point, an increase in information
intensifies fog and friction and delays decision-making. The irony is
most commanders want more information to validate assumptions and
mitigate risk. This phenomenon is not new. Clausewitz wrote, “Many
intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and
most are uncertain.” 32 Unfortunately, in a future war against a near-peer
enemy, an increase in information is likely to increase burdens on the
commander, add layers of bureaucracy, and lengthen decision-making
timelines. In short, technological pronouncements claiming the ability
to increase information flow and shorten decision-making should be
met with skepticism.
Technological advances that attempt to subvert or obscure the
nature of war are misleading. Readers of Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War
31      John A. Lynn, “Forging the Western Army in Seventeenth-Century France,” in Knox and
Murray, Dynamics of Military Revolution, 56.
32      Clausewitz, On War, 117.
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are confronted with the realization that the motives of fear, honor,
and interest (or profit) remain just as applicable today as they were in
ancient Greece.33 Likewise, his reconstruction of key speeches highlight
human nature’s willingness to replace an understanding of the nature of
war with a self-reflecting character of warfare oblivious to the factors of
fog, friction, and uncertainty.

Quo Vadis?

Humans end wars. This fact relates to war’s purpose and the
requirement to impose one’s will on the enemy. Drones and robots
certainly have utility as a means to wage violence in pursuit of rendering
an enemy powerless, but human political leaders are not likely to
surrender to robots. Additionally, the inclusion of drones and artificial
intelligence in warfare are likely to make war messier and increase
enmity among all entities. Why is this the case? Experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan confirmed the natural aversion toward suffering
remote attacks: improvised explosive devices have deleterious effects
on friendly forces, complicating the operational environment, making
simple tasks more difficult, and necessitating more moral and matériel
resources. This complexity erodes political will.
Likewise, in the face of effective manned and unmanned air strikes,
the enemy has adopted extreme operational security measures. Western
scholars and government officials continue to debate the legality and
ethics of improvised explosive devices and drone strikes. But, the negative
consequences of engaging in protracted war are well documented by Sun
Tzu, who advised against them, and Mao Zedong, who used them with
success against the Japanese.34 This dichotomy is one of the reasons
defense is the stronger form of warfare. Protraction blunts the attacker’s
means and stalls the aim, which prevents achieving the purpose.
Improvised explosive devices and air strikes are low-tech compared
with robot-led warfare; however, human responses to the low-tech
weapons may indicate future responses to the presence of high-tech
assets on the battlefield. As experts grapple with the character of
drone and artificial intelligence warfare, the logical starting point
must emphasize that humans end wars. A failure to orient on this fact
risks deviating toward a purely tactical discussion on the character of
robotic warfare as opposed to the more meaningful study on integrating
such warfare into the nature of war. Again, this detail relates to war’s
purpose: drone swarms may be able to start wars, but they cannot end
them. Humans retain this responsibility. Authority can be delegated,
responsibility cannot.
33      Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. C. F. Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1919).
34      Sun Tzu observed “no country has ever benefited from a protracted war,” and Mao Zedong
advised “energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese
occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory.” Sun Tzu, The Art
of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41; and Mao Tse-tung,
On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2005), 69.
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War only exists if the enemy fights back. Offense does not make
a war, defense does. As Clausewitz writes, “The animosity and the
reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have
ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken.” 35 If an entity uses
robots to conduct a massive offensive and destroys the opponent’s entire
robot army, does the war end? Or did a naïve population just realize
they would have to fight the war themselves? Are they ready? What is
the legal justification of the casus belli and enmity animating their will?
In the event of a successful large-scale offensive using robots, the
opponent will not likely stop fighting because of drones or robots.
The defenders’ enmity will likely increase, thereby hardening their
will. Arguably, a robot attack is a humiliating and dehumanizing, if
not outright fearful, prospect. In fact, it is more likely incorporating
autonomous drones and robots will increase enmity to a fever pitch.
In other words, a series of drone battles only delays, and exacerbates,
the inevitable clash of human wills. As Clausewitz mentioned, “Theorists are apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a trial of strength
without emotion entering into it.” 36 A myopic focus on machine warfare
may actually cede the physical and moral initiative to an enemy unable,
or unwilling, to field a robot army, and may increase the intellectual gap
between the military and the civilian society.
Likewise, the United States remains focused on preserving Pax
Americana. This priority requires containing or deterring adversaries,
supporting allies, and maintaining the status quo, but it also induces a
degree of strategic malaise that negatively impacts risk assessment and
resource allocation, often leading to protracted conflicts for limited aims.
A ceaseless flow of operational requirements results in a high degree
of force dispersion, with a constrained ability to concentrate forces,
without accepting significant risk in another area. This strategy assumes
forces will be reallocated as necessary, but also encourages organizations
to adopt a “react to contact” approach.
Arguably, the current paradigm promotes sensitivity to shortterm disturbances, especially when the problem is solvable with forces
already assigned. This model is less effective for addressing underlying
causes over the long term because maintaining the status quo requires a
dispersed force lay down. Increasing force levels, even by a small margin,
usually necessitates shifting assets across combatant commands, a move
that requires justification—and political will—even for very short-term
situations. This construct cedes the initiative to the enemy who watches
and learns, operating below the traditional US thresholds for employing
war’s means. This dichotomy subverts one’s appreciation for the nature
of war, replacing it with a ceaseless search for a character of warfare
that promises to solve short-term security issues and maintain the status
quo. Again, this perspective leads to normative vice empirical theorizing
that becomes dominated by a discussion on how a capability or activity
35      Clausewitz, On War, 90.
36      Clausewitz, On War, 138.
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supports friendly actions instead of the connection with war’s aim and
purpose. In short, a discussion on future war should remain wedded to
an understanding of the nature of war.
Finally, the current emphasis on promoting high-tech platforms
in professional journals, popular science fiction, and the media limits
the discussion to the tactical level. Likewise, conflating the character of
warfare with the nature of war prevents appreciating how capabilities
function at the operational level of war. Therefore, accounting for the
operational level—instead of leaping between tactics and strategy—
elucidates how a thinking enemy will respond and adjust.
The United States pursues increasingly lethal means for waging war
while also striving to reduce occurrences of warfare to the smallest amount
possible. This endeavor is not a contradiction, but if unaccounted for,
distorts the conceptual nature of war and character of warfare. Historical
examples demonstrate the risks of failing to appreciate war’s nature and
the importance of thinking like an operational artist. Thus, this article
does not diminish the importance of technological innovation outright
but serves as a reminder that the blind pursuit of the next “decisive”
capability, or offset, may come at the cost of personnel readiness, diverse
platforms, and appreciation of war’s objective nature.

